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Abstract 
This paper estimates the volume of informal trade between Algeria and Mali and analyzes its 
determinants and mechanisms, using a multi-pronged methodology. In addition to mirror statistics 
analysis, we provide evidence of the importance of informal trade, drawing on satellite images and 
surveys with informal traders in Mali and Algeria. We estimate that the weekly turnover of informal 
trade fell from approximately US$2 million in 2011 to US$0.74 million in 2014, but that trade 
continues to play a crucial role in the economies of northern Mali and southern Algeria. We also 
show that official trade statistics are meaningless in this context because they capture less than 3 
percent of total trade. Meanwhile, profit margins of 20–30 percent on informal trade help to explain 
the relative prosperity of northern Mali. Informal trade probably plays a strong role in poverty 
reduction, especially in the Kidal region.   
JEL classification codes: F14, H26, J46 
Keywords: informal trade, Algeria, Mali, customs, smuggling, Kidal 
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Introduction 
 
With the rise of states with demarcated political boundaries, trade became regulated by government 
institutions, and, in parallel, informal trade began to develop. The term informal trade first appeared 
in a report of the International Labour Organization (1972) and then in an article by Hart (1973), an 
anthropologist who had worked in Ghana (Cantens, Ireland, and Raballand 2015). Informal trade 
forces states to strike a balance between rule avoidance and local economic development. Border 
studies and studies of informal trade are now commonly conducted by anthropologists, political 
scientists, and economists.  
 
Using mirror trade statistics, economists have demonstrated that tariff evasion is quite widespread, 
especially among developing countries. These countries often report undervalued imports or 
“missing imports” or undervalued exports or “lost exports”see, for example, Sequeira 
(forthcoming) who examines the situation in southern Africa. Various investigators have used official 
trade statistics to show the large discrepancies between declared imports and exportssee Fisman 
(2004), Jean and Mitaritonna (2010), Kaminski and Mitra (2012), Carrère and Grigoriou (2014), and 
Vezina (2015). The mirror statistics approach dates from the late 1960s with Bhagwati (1967), but it 
is now experiencing a revival, probably because of the easier access to detailed trade statistics data, 
the greater interest of African states in collecting tariff revenue, and a research interest in corruption 
and tariff evasion. 
 
In several cases, informal cross-border trade has been estimated based on surveys, interviews, and 
consumption comparisons, thereby demonstrating the weakness of official trade statistics, mainly in 
Africa. Raballand and Mjekiqi (2010) estimated that the value of informal trade between Nigeria and 
Benin totaled several billion dollars in 2009; Golub (2012) estimated in West Africa the volume of 
informal trade in “entrepôt countries”, such as Benin and Togo and Ayadi et al. (2014) demonstrated 
for Tunisia that the volume of informal cross-border trade was higher than that of the official trade 
between Tunisia and Algeria in 2013. 
 
Algeria and Mali may be an extreme case because of the weakness of the state in the northern part 
of Mali. However, customs corruption and state capacity in this part of Africa seem to be 
comparable to that in other parts of the continent and can therefore illustrate the inaccuracy of 
official trade statistics and better describe the reasons behind such discrepancies. 
 
This paper presents estimates of the informal cross-border trade2 between Algeria and Mali (see 
map 1, which shows Mali and its border region with Algeria). It contributes to the growing literature 
on the inaccuracy or unreliability of official trade statistics, especially in Africa. 
                                                          
2 Informal cross-border trade is defined as the flow of goods not reported or inadequately reported to customs 
authorities. Thus it encompasses two practices: (1) the trade in goods through border posts for which false 
statements are made about the types or quantities of goods, and (2) the smuggling of goods (that is, when 
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Map 1 Mali 
 
Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/mali_pol94.jpg. 
 
 
Trade in the Sahel is paradoxical. On the one hand, observers and anthropologists describe at length 
the economic and social importance of trade between Mali and Algeria. On the other, according to 
official trade statistics the trade total is US$1–$2 million a year, and so the cross-border trade is 
minimal.3 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
goods are passed unknown to customs authorities through or outside of border posts). The estimates 
presented here do not include products whose import is illegal in Mali (such as weapons and drugs) because 
collecting information and data on these products is even more difficult. Since 2013, Algerian authorities have 
considered any trade with Mali as smuggling because the border is officially closed. 
3 All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated. Conversions in this report are made on the 
basis of US$1 = CFAF (Communauté Financière Africaine Franc) 480 in 2014. 
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Informal cross-border trade is said to be essential to survival of the Saharan region. Among others, 
Scheele (2012) has described the channels of this type of trade between southern Algeria and Mali. 
Scheele gives the impression that, for decades, informal cross-border trade has been largely 
tolerated on both sides of the border because, as in other regions of the world, it has enabled local 
populations, remote from capitals, to benefit from income generation and employment. 
As for the main findings of this article, the official trade statistics appear to be extremely partial. A 
comparison of our findings with the official statistics reveals a ratio of 1 to 15 (and 1 to 40 in 2011) 
between official and unofficial trade. Indeed, based on cross-checks of different sources and relying 
on the estimated volumes, products, and destinations used in different regions of the world, we 
estimated the total informal cross-border trade between Algeria and Mali in 2011 at over $85 
million, but it declined to less than $30 million in Mali in 2014.4  
 
This article is organized as follows. The next section describes the weaknesses of official trade 
statistics. We then present satellite images demonstrating that the closure of the border is not so 
effective and estimate the volume of the informal cross-border trade in 2011 and 2014. The next 
section presents the economic incentives for smuggling and the underlying reasons for such trade 
flows. The last section offers our conclusions.  
The official trade data  
To get an overview of trade between Algeria and Mali, and identify the most traded goods, we 
analyzed official statistics in the COMTRADE database, based on customs declarations of both 
countries.  
Mirror statistics literature proposes using the difference between the measurements reported by 
the authorities of the importing and exporting countries for the same trade flow to obtain an initial 
assessment of the informal cross-border trade. In principle, there is a minimum difference between 
the reported values on both sides of a border because exports are valued f.o.b. (without freight and 
insurance), and imports are valued c.i.f. (shipping and insurance costs are included). The difference 
can then be amplified by classification errors, problems of time, exchange rates, etc.5 However, 
Bhagwati (1967) noted that for over 30 percent of the difference between reported imports and 
exports, “classic" explanations are no longer satisfactory. Beyond this threshold, presumption of 
undervaluation or overvaluation of imports or exports would be preferred. 
 
The difference is calculated for a given year and a given pair of countries as 
%𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘 = (𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑘 ) 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘⁄ . 
 in which k corresponds to a category of goods defined at level 6 of the Harmonized System (HS) 
classification, Revision 2. 
                                                          
4 If we include informal cross-border trade to Niger and Nigeria, the informal cross-border trade volume 
amounted to over $150 million. This research was based on interviews carried out during the spring of 2014 in 
the subregion, and the satellite images were taken in March 2014.  
5 For a discussion of potential explanations, see Raballand, Cantens, and Arenas (2013). 
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According to the official statistics, trade between Algeria and Mali is extremely low.  
Analysis of the official statistics seemed to reveal an enigma because Algerian authorities claimed 
that Algeria had a trade surplus with Mali, and Malian authorities claimed that Mali had a trade 
surplus with Algeria.  
According to Algeria’s official trade statistics, imports from Mali increased from $1.46 million in 2000 
to over $6 million in 2010 and exports from $742,000 in 2000 to over $5 million in 2010 (for Niger 
and Mali). However, there appeared to be no correspondence between the flow of Malian exports 
to Algeria reported by the Malian authorities and the flow of imports from Mali reported by the 
Algerian authorities. The available trade data between Algeria and Mali are fluctuating and not 
reliable (see table 1, which summarizes the total trade flows between Algeria and Mali based on the 
customs declarations in COMTRADE). The transaction values recorded by the two countries are very 
different: Malian authorities recorded imports of over $1.89 million in 2011, whereas Algerian 
authorities recorded a total value of only $1.02 million in exports to Mali for the same year. 
Similarly, Malian authorities recorded exports to Algeria of more than $11.57 million in 2011, 
whereas Algerian authorities recorded a value of only $0.10 million in imports for the same year.  
Table 1 Total Recorded Trade Flows: Algeria and Mali, 2007–12  
US$, millions 
Year 
Algerian exports 
(recorded value 
on entry in Mali) 
Algerian exports 
(recorded value 
when leaving 
Algeria) 
Malian exports 
(recorded value 
on entry in 
Algeria) 
Malian exports 
(recorded value 
when leaving 
Mali) 
2007 1.32 0.62 0.16 1.95 
2008 4.94 0.64 0.00 2.39 
2009 0.00 2.65 0.00 0.00 
2010 1.54 0.27 0.00 3.11 
2011 1.89 1.02 0.10 11.57 
2012 1.84 0.58 0.25 1.85 
Source: COMTRADE. 
In 2007 Malian authorities recorded the entry of 13 different types of goods, whereas the Algerian 
authorities recorded the export of 141 different types of goods for the same year (see table 2). As 
for Malian exports to Algeria, there is a low flow of registered trade, except for the year 2011 when 
42 types of exports were recorded on the Malian side, whereas Algeria recorded receiving only four 
imports from Mali (see table 2).  
Table 2 Range of Goods Exchanged between Algeria and Mali, 2007–12  
 Number of imported 
goods recorded by 
Malian authorities 
Number of exported 
goods recorded by 
Algerian authorities 
Number of Malian 
exports recorded (to 
Algeria) 
Number of 
Algerian imports 
recorded (from 
Mali) 
2007 13 141 2 7 
2008 149 21 8 1 
2009 0 30 0 4 
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2010 35 27 6 0 
2011 52 31 42 4 
2012 59 70 6 4 
Source: COMTRADE. 
Where the exported goods reported by Algerian authorities and Malian imports appear to 
correspond, some wide disparities on recorded values and tonnage may be evident. Dates, for 
example, represent the largest volume of business, with an import value in 2011 of over $947,000 or 
approximately nine times the export value, $107,840. However, the main discrepancies in trade in 
2011 can be found for mineral water and the equipment needed to purify water.6 The trade gap is 
more than 120 times the import value of mineral water and 880 times the import value of 
purification equipment.7 According to Algerian authorities, in five out of six years the most 
commonly exported goods are medical needles and other organic materials (HS6 294200), followed 
by water purification machines, salt, and vegetable oils (HS 151590 and HS 151790).  
Malian authorities report that Malian exports are dominated by fruit exports, guava and mango, 
which, with a value of more than $2 million in 2011, had the highest export value between 2007 and 
2012. According to Algerian authorities, cotton (HS 520100) was the main Malian export over the 
study period, with a value of $2.5 million in 2012.  
In the official trade statistics, the fuel trade has extremely low values. Algerians declare that gasoline 
exports (HS 271000) amounted to $14,238 in 2007 and $7,105 in 2010. Malians declare that gasoline 
imports (HS 271000) amounted to $19,064 in 2011 and gas imports (HS 271129) amounted to $623 
in 2008. No exports of cigarettes from Algeria are recorded. Annex B reveals Malian imports of 
cigarettes and gasoline in the official statistics as well as their total value and tonnage.  
The empirics of smuggling in northern Mali 
In spite of the border closure, smuggling continues between Algeria and Mali (although the volume 
has fallen sharply since 2011). The explanation is that the economic integration of northern Mali and 
Algeria is in fact rational. 
This section presents some geographical factors explaining such flows, an indirect measure of 
smuggling with price gradients in Mali, some evidence of smuggling in the form of satellite images, 
and finally some estimates of the informal trade before and after the border closure. 
An economic justification 
Economically, even without considering the Algerian subsidies on transport and goods, it is 
understandable that the Malian cities of Kidal, and even Gao, gravitate toward Algeria because 
transit times are between seven and eight days to Algiers as opposed to at least 17 days to Dakar 
(Senegal) or via the southern road to Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) or Tema (Ghana)see table 3. 
Moreover, the cost of shipping transport is much lower at ports in North Africa than those in West 
Africa. Finally, Kidal, for example, is not even linked to a paved road to Bamako, whereas border 
                                                          
6 For a detailed list of official traded goods, see annex A. 
7 These flows correspond to the humanitarian aid Algeria sent to Mali in 2011 in the water and health sectors, 
especially targeting regions in northern Mali. 
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towns in Algeria are linked to Algiers with paved roads. The internal economic integration of Mali 
thus seems relatively dysfunctional. 
Table 3 Comparison of Distances and Average Transit Times between Kidal, Gao, and Bamako in 
Mali to Algiers, Dakar, Abidjan, and Tema  
 Kidal Gao Bamako 
Distance (km) 
Algiers (Algeria) 2,297 2,597 4,193 
Dakar (Senegal) 2,950 2,650 1,400 
Abidjan (Côte 
d’Ivoire) 
2,400 2,050 1,150 
Tema (Ghana) 2,250 1,900 2,000 
    
Average transit times (days) 
Algiers 7 8 20 
Dakar 18 17 13 
Abidjan 23 22 19 
Tema 24 23 22 
Source: Comité de liaison de la route Transsaharienne (Liaison Committee for the Trans-Saharan Road 2009).  
Almost all of the products sold in northern Mali are those subsidized in Algeria pasta products, 
flour, and semolina products, but also fuel. In spite of the official closure of the Algerian border in 
January 2013, informal cross-border trade flows remain significant.  
An indirect measure: price differentials 
As just noted, Mali directly benefits from subsidy policies established by the Algerian authorities for 
certain products. This explains in part the access of the residents of northern Mali to products that 
cost less than those in Bamako. Kidal benefits even more because its prices are quite similar to those 
in Algeria. In terms of fuel, customs clearance of fuel is authorized only in Bamako, which allows the 
region up to Douentza to benefit from Algerian fuel prices. 
Kidal is largely economically integrated with Algeria through informal cross-border trade. Figure 1 
compares the prices of sugar, milk, couscous, refrigerators, cement, and flat screen TVs in four 
Malian cities with those in Kidal. Except for the prices of cement and milk in Bamako, Kidal is the 
least expensive city for all products. Apart from flat screen TVs, Gao and Timbuktu are often more 
expensive than Bamako and Mopti, which can be explained by the transport costs in relation to the 
Algerian border (or in relation to Bamako).8 
  
                                                          
8 It has not been possible to estimate the poverty impact of such price differentials because household surveys 
do not have enough disaggregated data on household consumption. 
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Figure 1 Comparison of Prices of Six Goods in Gao, Timbuktu, Mopti, and Bamako versus Kidal  
 
Source: National Statistical Institute of Mali. 
 
Evidence from satellite images 
To examine the presence of informal cross-border trade routes across the border, we commissioned 
a set of satellite images. The images were taken in March 2014, with a resolution of 50 centimeters 
and are 100 percent cloud-free. Because trucks and cars leave marks in dry terrain, the images bear 
witness to the transport activity around the border.   
A sophisticated algorithm was used to identify informal roads on satellite images.9 Automated data 
extraction of road traces was followed by a manual process (road digitization and importance 
qualification) to extract alternative roads from the large data set. This manual process helped to 
connect roads, close gaps generated by the automated process, and remove some false road 
segments that were identified along geological or topological edges.10 
 
Informal roads were classified as minor or major, based on the visible depth of the traces and the 
number of parallel/adjacent traces clustered together (images 1 and 2). As a rule of thumb, when 
several traces (eight or more) were visible and organized in a cluster (as shown in image 1), the road 
was classified as major. In some areas, when the trace was very deep (roads were used several times 
by different vehicles), the road was also classified as major (otherwise it was classified as minor). 
 
The satellite maps indicate intense trading activity around the Algeria-Mali border, despite its official 
closure. Maps 2 and 3 display major (red) and minor (green) off roads and the official roads (black 
dotted lines) around the border towns of Bordj Badji Mokhtar and In Khalil. Both major and minor 
                                                          
9 For more details on the methodology, see annex C. 
10 Because of the arid terrain, traces remain present on satellite images for weeks or even months, depending 
on the depth of the trace. 
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roads are numerous. Over a distance of 2 kilometers, there are at least three major routes (in red) 
over the border going to Bordj Badji Mokhtar.  
Image 1 Satellite Image of a Major Informal Road 
 
 
Image 2 Satellite Image of a Minor Informal Road (One Trace) 
 
 
Maps 2 and 3 show the many roads that exist beyond the “official” roads (the black line in the 
middle of the image is the border between Algeria and Mali). Over a distance of 2 kilometers, at 
least three major routes (in red) cross the border near Bordj Badji Mokhtar. Therefore, despite 
official closure of the border, several trucks or cars are likely to go through the border every day in 
the vicinity of Bordj Badji Mokhtar. 
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Map 2 Informal Routes around Bordj Badji Mokhtar 
 
 
Map 3 Informal Routes around In Khalil 
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Estimating the volume of the informal cross-border trade 
Methodology 
Unlike in similar studies in Africa, it was not possible, for security reasons, to visit physically the 
Algeria-Mali border and conduct interviews there. We therefore had to cross-check the information 
provided by the various stakeholders interviewed, which included, on both sides of the border,  a 
dozen traders, as well as local authorities, representatives of customs, and journalists who were well 
aware of trading practices.  
Data and information were collected in several steps: 
1. Customs and informants (on both sides of the border) were interviewed to identify the 
goods mainly traded between Algeria and Mali. In this way, we were able to identify some 
distribution networks and some traders.  
2. The preliminary data and information were then cross-checked with the information 
gathered from the interviews conducted with those practicing formal and informal cross-
border trade in Algeria and Mali in order to understand the networks, routes, and 
commodity prices.11  
3. Estimates of the volume of informal cross-border trade were then derived from the route, 
quantity, and price data. 
Computations were based on statements by the traders and customs officers 12  who were 
interviewed and asked about the number of vehicles crossing the border per week in 2011 and 2014, 
the products transported, their destination, and the selling price in different cities.  
Averages were then calculated. Based on interviews about the means of transport, assumptions 
were made about unit tonnage and overloads. It was thus possible to calculate the turnover per 
product per city per week and per year.  
“Supply chains” are mainly organized by a limited number of trucks/importers per product. It was 
confirmed during interviews that usually less than a dozen Malian “wholesalers” import cargo from 
Algeria. We therefore sought access to some of the “wholesalers” because they would know best 
the total quantities to order, on average, per week for any type of good. Several of them dealing 
with several products were interviewed. Wholesalers also mainly act as a network that often is 
linked by tribal, family, or ethnic ties, and therefore information is available as long as one has 
access to one of those groups. 
Despite the cross-checking conducted of various sources of information, the limitations of this work 
should be taken into account, and therefore figures are only estimates and may differ from reality. 
However, the magnitude of such flows does seem plausible. Moreover, to our knowledge these 
estimates are the first of this type for Algeria–Mali informal trade flows. 
                                                          
11 A rather similar approach was used by Golub (2012) in West Africa. 
12 Approximately a dozen of traders and customs officers still involved or controlling this trade were 
interviewed. 
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Results 
The main border crossing between Algeria and Mali, Bordj Badji Mokhtar, appears to have been 
superseded since 2012 by Tinzawaten and Timiaouine in Algeria.  
 
The main products exported (smuggled) from Algeria to Mali are food (dates, flour, pasta, semolina, 
and milk powder) and gasoline, followed by consumer goods (appliances). In export volume, these 
products exceed the volume of Malian imports, which mainly consist of livestock products (sheep 
and camels) and bazin (traditional fabric), as well as Chinese green tea and cigarettes. Most of the 
trucks returning to Algeria from Mali are loaded with livestock collected along the route to Algeria. 
Traders often import several types of cargo, including fuel barrels. It is estimated that 90 percent of 
supplies are preordered, a growing trend since the introduction of mobile and satellite phones to the 
“professional” structure of networks. 
According to the interviewees, 180 trucks per week in “normal time”that is, in 201113crossed 
the Algerian-Malian border, and 40 trucks crossed in 2014.14 For 2011, the distribution of trade flow 
between the cities and the category of trucks used were as follows: Timbuktu, 20 trucks (10 tons 
only); Kidal, 35 trucks (20 tons at 70 percent; 10 tons at 10 percent; 30 tons at 15 percent; 40 tons at 
5 percent); Gao, 35 trucks (20 tons at 70 percent; 40 tons at 30 percent); Bamako, 30 trucks (mainly 
20 tons); and Niger and Nigeria, 60 trucks (40 tons at 80 percent). The total tonnage was 4,6700 
(2,650 tons for Mali). Niger is de facto the main transit country for Nigerian imports from Algeria, but 
a portion of them transit first in Mali. 
For 2011 the breakdown per good was as follows: 35 trucks of flour, 30 trucks of pasta, 25 trucks of 
semolina, 20 trucks of other staple products (oil, drinks, sugar, and milk powder), 30 trucks of fuel, 
30 trucks of dates, 5 trucks of appliances, and 5 trucks of other products. In 2014 the breakdown was 
the following: 14 trucks of flour, 10 trucks of pasta, 4 trucks of semolina, 5 trucks of fuel, 3 trucks of 
sugar, 1 truck of milk powder, 1 truck of appliances, and 2 trucks of other products. 
Given the unit volume, in 2011 the goods traded between Algeria and Mali represented a weekly 
volume of 4,640 tons: 750 tons for the Kidal region, 930 tons for the Gao region, 200 tons for the 
Timbuktu region, 770 tons for Bamako, and 1,990 tons for Niger and Nigeria. Because trucks can be 
overloaded, 25 percent should be added to the average (a 10-ton truck will carry up to 13 tons). 
Table 4 provides details on the prices and quantities per good and city. 
                                                          
13 This year was selected because, according to all traders, it was the “apex” of informal trade between Algeria 
and Mali. Trade flows began to decrease as of 2012 because of the military coup in Bamako and the 
subsequent fighting in the north of the country. 
14 Between 15 and 20 percent of goods smuggled from Algeria end up in the south of Gao and in Douentza, 
Mopti, and the southern part of Mali.  
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 Table 4 Prices and Weekly Quantities of Consumer Goods by City,  2011 
 
Source: Authors’ computations based on interviews.  
 
Note: Prices are in Communauté Financière Africaine Francs (CFAF). Rate: US$1 = CFAF 506 in 2011 and CFAF 480 in 2014. All quantities are in tons. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Product 
Price in 
Bordj  Badji 
Mokhtar 
(Algeria, 
per ton) 
Kidal (Mali) Gao (Mali) Timbuktu (Mali) Bamako (Mali) 
Niger (Niamey, Tahoua, 
and Agadez) 
Total quantity 
Total 
quantity, 
Mali 
Total 
turnover 
(CFAF, 
millions) 
Total turnover, 
Mali 
(CFAF, millions) 
Price 
 per ton 
Qty. 
Price per 
ton 
Qty. Price per ton Qty. 
Price per 
ton 
Qty. Price per ton Qty.     
Flour 170,000 230,000 107 280,000 195 320,000 40 480,000 200 
470,000 
(Niamey) 
360,000 
(Tahoua) 
500 1042 542 401.0 188.0 
Pasta 270,000 350,000 140 420,000 170 450,000 30 560,000 100 460, 000 640 1080 440 483.4 189.0 
Dates 270,000 NS NS 486,000 60 NS NS 700,000 200 500,000 340 600 260 339.2 169.2 
Wheat 
semolina  
120,000 160,000 170 200,000 215 240,000 40 350,000 70 240,000 330 825 495 183.5 104.3 
Milk 1,400,000 1,583,000 10 1,900,000 40 2100, 000 0 2,500,000 30   80 80 166.8 166.8 
Diesel  200,000 250,000  143 300,000  100 350,000 40 
350,000 
(region of 
Mopti) 
100 360,000  
100 583 483 150.7 114.7 
Gasoline  400.000 525.000 100 
Imported 
from Niger 
0  0  0  
Sugar 310.000 350,000 30 400,000 70 
400,000 (from 
Mauritania) 
0 600,000 0 540,000 80 180 100 81.7 38.5 
Appliances 150,000 190,000 10 230,000 30 280,000 30 588,000 40   110 110 40.7 40.7 
Other 
products 
400,000 440,000 40 480,000 50 550,000 20 600,000 30   140 140 70.6 70.6 
Total  750  930  200  770  1,990 4,640 2,650 1917.6 1081.8 
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From the number of trucks and the breakdown per product, we computed turnover per product per citycolumns (1)–(5). The sum of imports from various cities 
is the total quantity per productcolumn (6). For each product, turnovercolumn (8)equals tonnage times the price for each city. Columns (7) and (9) exclude goods to 
Niger and Nigeria. Trade is quite low from July to September. Therefore, estimates are based on 40 weeks. Data are by week because traders use that time frame for their 
orders of goods from Algeria to Mali. 
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The total informal cross-border trade between Algeria and Mali in 2011 was estimated at over $85 
million, but it declined to less than $30 million in Mali in 2014. This revenue therefore fell by about 
two-thirds between 2011, the peak of trade between Algeria and Mali, and 2014. 
Official statistics seem totally inadequate because in 2011 Algerians officially reported $1.02 million 
in Malian exports and Malians reported $1.89 million in imports the same year, representing 1.2 
percent and 2.2 percent, respectively, of the estimated volume of informal cross-border trade. 
If the informal cross-border trade to Niger and Nigeria is included, the volume of informal cross-
border trade amounts to over $150 million in 2011. 
These estimates appear relatively low when compared with those for countries with weak 
governance where the same type of estimation was undertaken. Therefore, those estimates are 
probably conservative. In a regional comparison, informal imports are now lower in Mali15 at $45 per 
capita compared with Tunisia at $120 per capita, but they were almost similar in 2011 at $125 per 
capita. However, Mali remains lower than Nigeria ($250), but that probably stems from the fact that 
trade policy is much more restrictive in Nigeria than in Mali or Tunisia.16 
The impact of border closure: decrease in flows since 2011 but still remain 
important 
The 2013 closure of the border between Algeria and Mali led to the official end of trade between the 
two countries. In addition, on July 14, 2013, Algeria’s Council of Ministers adopted measures to limit 
fuel smuggling at the country’s borders because of its scale country-wide. In addition to their 
operational provisions, the adopted measures, still in force, were intended to control the 
distribution of fuel at gas stations by mandating the following: 
 Instigation of controls by police services at all gas stations, including those inside the country 
 Implementation of a reporting system to identify suspicious vehicles repeatedly passing the 
border 
 Control of allocations of fuel to fellah (farmers) 
 Ban on the allocation at gas stations of fuel to people with tanks and containers. 
 
Informal cross-border trade flows have been significantly disrupted since 2012 and the rebellion in 
northern Mali. There, the informal cross-border trade underwent a multifaceted crisis: a decrease in 
demand because of the outflow of refugees and displaced people from Mali beginning in 2012; a 
decrease in supplies because traders fled to Mauritania or Niger, or they were displaced in Bamako; 
growing insecurity surrounding the commercial routes, which discourages some traders still living in 
northern Mali; and finally the closure of the Algerian border. The estimated turnover for 2011 and 
2014 in Mali are presented in detail in table 5. 
 
                                                          
15 Data have been computed using figures for the population of northern Mali because the vast majority of is 
consumed in that area. 
16 Data for Nigeria (in particular the Lagos region) were taken from Raballand and Mjekiqi (2010); for Tunisia, 
from Ayadi et al. (2014). Figures are for all major imported products. 
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Table 5 Estimated Turnover: Mali, 2014 
 
Product Turnover in 2011 
(CFAF, millions) 
Trade decrease 
(%) 
Inflation (%) Turnover in 2014 
(CFAF, millions) 
Flour 188.0 60 30 97.8 
Pasta 
189.0 
66 30  
45a  
83.5 
Semolina 
104.3 
84 75 
230a 
29.2 
Fuel 114.7 84 100 18.4 
Sugar 38.5 50 25 24.1 
Milk powder 166.8 80 120 73.4 
Dates 169.2 100  0.0 
Appliances 40.7 80 25 10.2 
Other 70.6 80 40 19.8 
Total 1,081.8   356.3 
Data source: Interviews with traders and customs officials. 
Note: CFAF = Communauté Financière Africaine Franc. 
a. In Timbuktu. 
 
Some products such as diesel and gasoline are now traded at very low volumes. Both are subject to 
vigorous control by the Algerian security services, leading to inflation. This control is also applied to 
semolina, which has produced shortages in the three northern regions. The closure of the Algerian 
border has had the direct effect of diverting all trucks shipping datesthe only authorized product 
exported to Algeriatoward the Niger border. 
The trade flows evident as of early 2014 can in no way be compared with those recorded in a time of 
peace. The drop in turnover has been estimated at 67 percent. The closure of the Algerian border 
caused a substantial increase in prices, which did not necessarily lead to higher margins from 
merchants in northern Mali. The recorded inflation was the impact of a decrease in supply and in 
particular an increase in prices at the Algerian border. The main commercial consequence of this 
situation was fewer market opportunities for products from northern Mali. 
Some products turn out to be uncompetitive in Bamako, such as milk powder, which is now cheaper 
in Bamako (CFAF 35,500 per carton) than in Timbuktu (CFAF 50,000 per carton). Other products that 
have undergone significant inflation in the north have seen their prices stagnate or even decline in 
Bamako. A ton of flour now costs CFAF 450,000 in Bamako because it has been subject to inflation of 
30 percent in the three northern regions since 2011. A ton of sugar is now traded at CFAF 500,000 in 
Bamako, increasing by 25 percent in the three northern regions. The diversification of supplies in 
southern Mali has led to a trend of price stability and prevents the trading of products from the 
Algerian contraband.  
Some possible explanations for smuggling 
Subsidies and different price levels 
The wilayas (provinces) in southern Algeria, including Tamanrasset, have a double subsidy system: a 
system of compensation for transport costs that is applied exclusively to these provinces and a 
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system of subsidizing the prices of widely consumed products (applied to the entire Algerian 
territory). 
Because of the potential impact of subsidies on neighboring countries, Algeria put in place a barter 
system in 1994 to regulate trade flows in order to avoid subsidizing countries such as Mali and Niger, 
but also Morocco and Tunisia. It also prohibited the exports of subsidized goods in the barter trade 
regime. 
Algeria’s compensation fund for transport costs   
The compensation system for transport costs consists of reimbursement of the costs arising from the 
supply and distribution of general consumer goods at the level of the wilayas in the southern regions 
of Algeria (Tamanrasset, Illizi, Adrar, Tindouf, Ouargla, Bechar, El Beidh, El Oued, Ghardaia, and 
Naama). Reimbursement covers transport both among and within wilayas. This scheme is intended 
to provide general consumer goods for people living in remote areas in southern Algeria. 
 
The reimbursement system is calculated on the following basis: amount of compensation per 
operation = distance (km) × weight (tons) × DA 3 (Algerian dinars). For example, a company 
transporting a load of 40 tons from Tamanrasset to Alger (a distance officially estimated at 1,945 
kilometers) would be entitled to reimbursement of DA 233,400 ($2,680). However, according to 
interviewees, the real cost of transportation is DA 180,000 ($2,070), which means a significant profit 
for the transporter, who has an incentive to transport goods between both cities.  
The importance of consumer subsidies in Algeria 
In Algeria, the main subsidized products are the following: 
 Normal semolina: DA 900 ($10.30) per 25 kilograms17 
 Superior quality semolina: DA 1,000 ($11.50) per 25 kilograms 
 Milk: DA 25 ($.30) per liter 
 Flour: DA 2,000 ($23) per 100 kilograms (bakers), DA 2,080 ($23.90) per 100 kilograms 
(retailers), DA 2,180 ($25.10) per 100 kilograms (consumers) 
 Sugar: between DA 90 ($1) and DA 95 ($1.05) per kilogram 
 Oil: DA 600 ($6.90) per 50 liters, DA 250 per 2 liters, DA 125 per 1 liter 
 Cement: the price of cement is not defined, but high profit margins are fixed at DA 40 per 25 
kilograms (wholesalers), or $.50 per kilogram, and DA 80 per 25 kilograms (retailers). 
The budget allocation for subsidized products is not based on a study of actual consumption needs. 
Each wholesaler legally registered and not considered a smuggler is entitled to claim this refund, 
whatever the number of transactions and the amount of products shipped. When the refunds 
requested exceed the allocated budget, the outstanding amounts are rolled over to the following 
year.  
Fuel is very heavily subsidized in Algeria. Throughout the country, regular gasoline sells for DA 21.20 
($.27) per liter, super for DA 23 ($.29) per liter, and diesel for DA 13.70 ($.17) per liter. The selling 
price in Mali was over $1.40 per liter in 2012. 
                                                          
17 In this article, $US1 = DA 75 in 2011 and DA 87 in 2014. 
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In border localities, each identified operator is limited in the quantities of subsidized products that 
can be traded in these regions. But this scheme does not limit the number of traders who are able to 
register for this activity, and thus it does not limit the threshold for allocations in border areas.  
Restrictive trade arrangements 
The border between Algeria and Mali is 1,376 kilometers long. Surveillance of the southern Algerian 
border is difficult because the population density is very low, particularly in the far south. Algeria’s 
border with Niger is 956 kilometers. These borders cover a Saharan region crossed by tracks used by 
traders.  
 
Several trade agreements have been signed between Algeria and Mali since 1975. The suspension in 
Algeria of the international transit regime (after alleged fraud) marked the end of the official massive 
supply of Mali and Niger through Algerian ports. To limit the exports of subsidized goods from 
southern Algeria to Mali and Niger, the Algerian authorities created a barter system but it has not 
been in effect with Mali since 2013.  
 
A barter trade was already under way before 1994 because of the inconvertibility of the Algerian 
dinarthe proceeds from the sale of a product allowed the purchase of another one. Flows in both 
directions were established: dates–agricultural products, salt–livestock, construction materials–
products from Nigerian industry, and so forth (Grégoire 1998). Since then, the barter trade has been 
established via a 1994 Algerian regulation.18 The system set up by Algerian authorities (Ministry of 
Trade) attempts to “normalize” trade based on the traditional trade ties between Algeria and West 
Africa dating from long before the colonial period and the constitution of the Algerian state.  
In the order of 1994, the main text regulating barter trade stresses in its two first sections the 
exceptional nature of barter trade. This system tries to regulate barter trade strictly while providing 
local administrative authorities with wide power of management and control. Under this same 
system, a balance between import and export values within the framework of barter trade must be 
strictly observed; the proceeds from the sale of Malian and Nigerien goods can only be allocated to 
the purchase of Algerian goods included in the list and the amount of purchased goods for export 
must not be higher than declared on entry (article 8). The order of 1994 set out the list of goods 
admitted under the barter on a tax and duties suspension basis.19 To ensure a strict trade balance, 
customs maintains a tracking sheet of the transactions of each trader. At the end of the year, to 
comply with barter regulation, each operator who has not balanced its operations has to address the 
gap the following year under penalty of registration suspension. 
 
                                                          
18 Section 128 of the Finance Act of 1994 and the Decree Inter. of December 14, 1994, setting out the 
arrangements for exercising the barter trade with Niger and Mali (OJ No. 7 of February 15, 1995, p. 30) and 
repealing the decree of April 5, 1991, fixing the conditions and terms of import and export of goods under the 
barter trade border with Mali (OJ No. 29 of June 12, 1991, p. 914). 
19 The Algerian products authorized for barter are common dates; frezza dates, to the exclusion of other 
varieties of deglet nour dates; domestic salt; household objects made of plastic, aluminum, cast iron, iron, and 
steel; blankets; and local crafts, excluding wool rugs. The authorized products from Mali and Niger are 
livestock, henna, green tea, spices, turban fabric, Tarri fabric, mil, rancid butter for local consumption, dried 
vegetables, rice, and mango. Since the closure of the borders, only dried dates are allowed for export. 
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Even before the closure of the border, official barter trade had been falling since 2011: from $3.4 
million in 2011 to $700,000 in 2013. 
Corruption in border control agencies 
In terms of customs controls, before 2012 there were some attempts on the Malian side to increase 
the number of declarations (even though duties were usually paid by a fixed amount by truck). Since 
2013, however, customs has not yet been able to deploy back to the border or even to Kidal on a 
permanent basis. Therefore, there is de facto a laissez-faire policy, which may be explained by the 
current social and political tensions in the north of the country. In Algeria, controls are better 
enforced, even though the data on seizures are so low that collusion or bribing of some officials at 
the border may not be excluded (and was confirmed by traders’ interviews). 
 
Since the mid-2000s, efforts have been made to reaffirm the customs presence in northern Mali, in 
particular in Timbuktu. Before the crisis of 2012, a customs station operated in In Khalil, where it 
collected tariffs and duties. Customs agreed on a fixed price according to the goods transported, but 
it was more or less symbolic for each truck entering Mali on the condition that the truck not 
continue its journey south. If it did not comply, duties increased and the driver of the truck had to 
make an import declaration.20 This factor explains the weakness of the official import data because, 
to a great extent, imports from Algeria to northern Mali were not reported. 
 
According to several customs sources in Mali, 60 percent of the flows escape customs control. 
Quantities reported to customs are generally 40–50 percent less than the actual flows. Moreover, 
trucks are usually overloaded by 20–30 percent. Thus goods are declared for about 20 percent of 
their actual value. On average, customs offices in the north have been collecting about $1–$1.5 
million, which means that the goods were probably cleared for about 5–10 percent of their value 
(for an average tariff rate of 20–25 percent).21 
 
Today, the situation seems to have deteriorated even more because only a few tens of thousands of 
dollars are collected at the border (less than 1 percent of the value), and there are no longer any 
customs offices in northern Mali, largely because of the rebellion in January 2012. Malian customs 
officials struggle to win against smuggling actors, who are increasingly more organized and who have 
little difficulty in rendering customs offices inoperative. Customs offices are slowly reestablishing 
themselves in Timbuktu and Gao, but there are only a few agents in these two cities, and they are 
unable to travel in the region. In Kidal, there is no custom presence. 
                                                          
20 For a 10-ton truck coming from Bordj Badji Mokhtar, paid duties in 2014 were about CFAF 75,000 ($156) in 
Kidal, CFAF 120,000 ($250) in Gao, CFAF 140,000 ($290) in Timbuktu, and CFAF 400,000 ($830) in Bamako, as 
in northern Niger. These figures are averages. Many traders are paying duties sometimes more modest 
because of the corruption within customs, or even sometimes are fully exempt from customs duties by 
circumventing customs offices. 
21 According to the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), customs duties at the Malian 
border (in percentage of the value of goods) are 20 percent for dates, couscous, pasta, and cigarettes and 10 
percent for gasoline (for ordinary car) and car tires. 
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Conclusions  
In the Sahel as in other parts of the world, borders are a fertile ground for informal cross-border 
trade, especially in a desert area. Walther (2009) refers to a "mobile space" that is, the most 
appropriate method of managing uncertainty in Sahelian life. 
 
Trader networks in Mali control the main trade sectors. And it is not uncommon for mayors, 
deputies, or presidents of the regional chambers of commerce, or their counterparts, to be involved 
in these sectors.22 The system is therefore good for trade in northern Mali, but it erodes the 
legitimacy of these representatives elected by the population. It also explains why repression of the 
informal cross-border trade is all the more difficult because trader networks, which control flows, 
are decentralized (Walther 2014). Also, when a cargo is halted or a trader is neutralized, it is possible 
for another member of the network to replace the trader and to continue the traffic. 
 
This article has highlighted the following key features of informal trade in the Sahelian region: (1) 
official statistics are extremely unreliable and demonstrate that regional integration is much higher 
than official statistics usually indicate; (2) informal trade has a strong impact on poverty reduction; 
(3) satellite images may be useful in a dry terrain to identify informal trade routes (and could be 
used, for example, in Libya, Tunisia, and Mauritania); and (4) a multidisciplinary approach 
(anthropology, economic, governance) is useful to better assess all the aspects of informal trade in 
regions such as the Sahel. 
 
However, further study of informal trade is critical to understanding the “real” economy of Sahelian 
countries because formal companies usually account for only a small percentage of those found in a 
country. Despite the growing knowledge of the informal trade in the Sahel, many aspects, such as 
the link between licit and illicit trafficking, remain largely unknown and would require 
complementary research. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
22 Walther (2009) showed that traders were heavily represented in the National Assembly of Niger. 
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Annex A: Goods Recorded on Both Sides of the Border: Algeria to Mali, 2007–12 
Year Exchange products 
Declared value 
at import (US$) 
Declared value 
at export (US$) 
Ratio between 
declared value 
at import and 
export  
2007 Perfumes and toilet waters 87 83 1.05 
2007 Electrical appliances for switching 10,865 4,896 2.22 
2007 New pneumatic tires of rubber 224,199 64,773 3.46 
2007 Electrical switches for a voltage not exceeding 1,000 V 22,305 5,237 4.26 
2007 Needles, catheters, cannulae, and the like  23,859 46,642 0.51 
2007 Sodium hydrogencarbonate (sodium bicarbonate) 1,578 6,053 0.26 
2008 New pneumatic tires of rubber  256,727 109,014 2.35 
2008 Inner tubes of rubber 5,068 274 18.50 
2008 Other perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations 568 1220 0.47 
2008 Soap and organic surface-active products in bar 94 3,330 0.03 
2010 Sanitary towels and tampons, napkins 91,782 96,022 0.96 
2010 Filtering or purifying machinery and apparatus 62,936 68,040 0.92 
2010 Electrical switches for a voltage not exceeding 1,000 V  7,911 6,493 1.22 
2010 Other jams, fruit jellies, marmalades, etc. 223 129 1.73 
2010 Needles, catheters, cannulae, and the like  13,503 19,390 0.70 
2010 Electrical plugs and sockets for a voltage not exceeding 1,000 V 5,794 9,629 0.60 
2010 Sodium hydrogencarbonate (sodium bicarbonate) 83,574 10,918 7.65 
2010 Perfumes and toilet waters 1197 44 27.20 
2011 Perfumes and toilet waters 29 29 1.00 
2011 Instruments and appliances used for medical purpose 135,414 157,758 0.86 
2011 Citric acid 18,994 2,819 6.74 
2011 Dates, fresh or dried 947,290 107,840 8.78 
2011 Sanitary towels and tampons, napkins 84,175 3,495 24.08 
2011 Salt and pure sodium chloride; sea water 1,913 4,961 0.39 
2011 Sodium hydrogencarbonate (sodium bicarbonate) 19,471 53,345 0.37 
2011 Trade advertising material, commercial catalogues 68 263 0.26 
2011 Bentonite 1,162 11,188 0.10 
2011 Tubular metal needles and needles for sutures 1,426 16,297 0.09 
2011 Mineral waters and aerated waters, unsweetened 275 33,327 0.01 
2011 Filtering or purifying machinery and apparatus 398 350,764 0.00 
2012 Vinegar and substitutes for vinegar obtained 160 160 1.00 
2012 Surgical gloves 333 349 0.95 
2012 Syringes, with or without needles 244 264 0.92 
2012 Eye makeup preparations 118 107 1.10 
2012 Freezers of the upright type 6,734 4,859 1.39 
2012 Other jams, fruit jellies, marmalades, etc. 997 1,559 0.64 
2012 Sanitary towels and tampons, napkins 74,338 31,932 2.33 
2012 Soap and organic surface-active products in bar 882 278 3.17 
2012 Sodium hydrogencarbonate (sodium bicarbonate) 26,487 46,570 0.57 
2012 Garments of cotton, knitted or crocheted 1,287 25 51.48 
2012 Uncooked pasta, not containing eggs, not stuffed 43181 760 56.82 
2012 Couscous 2292,77 1,901 120.61 
2012 Beauty, makeup, skin care (including suntan)  723 1,602 0.45 
2012 Vegetable products  132 357 0.37 
2012 Unfrozen orange juice, unfermented 1,216 4,771 0.25 
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2012 Perfumes and toilet waters 84 345 0.24 
2012 Manicure or pedicure preparations 86 480 0.18 
2012 Trade advertising material, commercial catalogues 89 596 0.15 
2012 Tubular metal needles and needles for sutures 1,906 15,732 0.12 
2012 Shampoos 51 688 0.07 
Data source: UN COMTRADE. 
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Annex B: Imports of Cigarettes and Gasoline: Mali, 2007–12 
Year Exporting country Tonnage (kg) Value (US$) 
Ratio to 
total 
tonnage  
Ratio to 
total value  
Cigarettes           
2007 Benin 361,800 6,705,806 37% 29% 
2007 South Africa 609,790 16,045,517 62% 70% 
2007 Total 978,010 22,870,699     
2008 Benin 249,000 4,995,733 24% 17% 
2008 South Africa 796,173 24,020,439 76% 83% 
2008 Total 1,046,898 29,091,779    
2010 Benin 20,837 386,080 1% 1% 
2010 Senegal 13,444 491,939 1% 2% 
2010 South Africa 1,401,702 31,660,008 97% 97% 
2010 Switzerland 12,436 192,432 1% 1% 
2010 Total 1,449,631 3,275,6290     
2011 Senegal 10,704 337,013 0% 1% 
2011 South Africa 2,236,744 43,060,097 100% 99% 
2011 Total 2,247,588 43,397,619     
2012 Senegal 386,779 6,460,212 17% 17% 
2012 South Africa 1,923,189 31,573,934 83% 83% 
2012 Total 2,309,983 38,034,177     
Gasoline           
2007 Benin 116,268,585 89,338,418 18% 19% 
2007 Burkina Faso  18,943,967 7,375,192 3% 2% 
2007 Côte d'Ivoire 143,423,978 101,716,372 22% 22% 
2007 Ghana 51,423,696 37,953,627 8% 8% 
2007 Senegal 231,040,500 166,509,945 36% 35% 
2007 Togo 80,763,536 6,285,0512 12% 13% 
2007 Total 648,122,454 470,243,298     
2008 Benin 131,710,362 68,370,980 20% 10% 
2008 Côte d'Ivoire 130,920,524 147,560,768 20% 21% 
2008 Ghana 61,830,224 37,056,767 10% 5% 
2008 Senegal 248,145,957 405,520,714 38% 58% 
2008 Togo 67,593,994 28,665,569 10% 4% 
2008 Total 650,688,664 697,416,591    
2010 Benin 653,978,987 467,106,697 41% 39% 
2010 Côte d'Ivoire 245,049,731 172,518,793 16% 14% 
2010 Ghana 72,389,063 50,293,048 5% 4% 
2010 Senegal 467,384,158 399,858,285 30% 33% 
2010 Togo 120,187,706 95,054,371 8% 8% 
2010 Total 1,578,913,017 1,201,245,939   
2011 Benin 222,780,997 253,799,430 25% 26% 
2011 Côte d'Ivoire 128,113,517 145,604,076 14% 15% 
2011 Ghana 75,705,792 86,354,302 8% 9% 
2011 Senegal 417,733,154 428,311,413 47% 45% 
2011 Togo 31,625,163 29,241,745 4% 3% 
2011 Total 8,9351,4399 961,107,209   
2012 Benin 151,333,000 172,068,033 17% 18% 
2012 Burkina Faso 15,868,320 18,621,642 2% 2% 
2012 Côte d'Ivoire 114,477,971 129,099,918 13% 13% 
2012 Gambia, The 17,171,000 10,399,719 2% 1% 
2012 Ghana 62,415,167 69,525,921 7% 7% 
2012 Niger 8,8769,000 99,288,612 10% 10% 
2012 Senegal 433,966,422 447,072,157 48% 46% 
2012 Total 899,870,517 963,333,739   
Data source: UN COMTRADE. 
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Annex C: Algorithm Used to Identify Roads on Satellite Images 
 
The algorithm used can be summarized as follows: 
 
 Smooth image to reduce pixel size to 75 centimeters, judged as optimal. 
 Apply Gaussian pyramid to reduce processing time. 
 Apply anisotropic gradient to smooth image but keep irregular edges. 
 Apply Sobel filter to sharpen image edges (first-degree derivative). 
 Apply anisotropic gradient again. 
 Thresholding: set to 0 all pixels with values below mean. 
 Apply adaptive threshold method. 
 Remove all objects (= block contiguous white pixels) below 100-pixel size.  
 Compute eccentricity of bounding ellipse for all objects and keep only objects with 
eccentricity greater than 0.7 (to identify objects that are elongatedthat is, road segments). 
 Skeletonize image to keep only the trace. 
 Apply a Hough line transform to find lines (applied several times with different parameter 
values). 
 Keep only sets of lines that are parallel and close (distance interval is width of a truck). 
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A simple map was included at the end of the introduction. 
 
4. You could add a timeline graph to show the drop in informal trade following the policy 
implementation, and how it compares to comtrade data. 
Comtrade data are not recent enough to be able to have time series data before and after the 
closure of the border. 
 
Reviewer #2 
 
The paper is quite creative and original. I am not in a position to judge the soundness of the 
methodology, but the paper needs some careful editing and possibly some rewriting to make it read 
more like an academic paper. The conclusion needs to be expanded. 
 
The paper was professionally edited and the conclusion expanded. 
 
Reply to Referee's Comments
